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Gutekunst: An Analysis of the Unwed Father's Adoption Rights in Light of Cab

Comments
AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNWED FATHER'S ADOPTION RIGHTS
IN LIGHT OF CABAN V. MOHAMMED: A FOUNDATION
IN FEDERAL LAW FOR A NECESSARY REDRAFTING
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ADOPTION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1972 decision of Stanley v. Illinois,1 the United States Supreme
Court held that all parents, whether married or unmarried, are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness as paients before their chil-

dren can be removed from their custody. 2 Following this decision, lawsuits
were initiated by unwed fathers seeking a determination of their rights with
respect to the adoption of their illegitimate children. 3 Two major issues
were raised by these cases: 1) whether an unwed father's consent is constitutionally required in adoption proceedings; 4 and 2) whether notice must be

given to an unwed father prior to terminating his rights over his illegitimate
child and, if so, how must this notice be given. 5 Since the Stanley Court
did not address these issues, 6 the states lacked Supreme Court guidance
and, thus, differed over what constitutional rights the unwed father possessed with respect to the adoption of his illegitimate children. 7 However, in
1. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2. Id. at 658. For a discussion of Stanley, see notes 17-25 and accompanying text infra.
3. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974); Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972); Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 II1. App. 3d
260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1972); Catholic Charities v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1975); Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, appeal dismissed sub
nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1977); Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d
666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1972); Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976); Lewis v.
Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
4. See Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067, 1067 (9th Cir. 1974); Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 I11.2d 20, 21, 284 N.E.2d 291, 292 (1972); Catholic Charities v. Zalesky, 232
N.W.2d 539, 542 (Iowa 1975); Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 569, 331 N.E.2d
486, 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513, appeal dismissed sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042
(1977); Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666, 667-68, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104
(1972); Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 167, 360 A.2d 603, 604 (1976); Lewis v. Lutheran
Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 207 N.W.2d 826, 830 (1973). For a discussion of how the states
dealt with this issue, see notes 26-65 and accompanying text infra.
5. See Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067, 1067 (9th Cir. 1974); Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 III. 2d 20, 21, 284 N.E.2d 291, 292 (1972); Catholic Charities v. Zalesky, 232
N.W.2d 539, 542 (Iowa 1975); Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 569, 331 N.E.2d
486, 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513, appeal dismissed sub nomn. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042
(1977); Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666, 667-68, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104
(1972); Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 207 N.W.2d 826, 830 (1973). For a
discussion of how the states dealt with this issue, see notes 26-65 and accompanying text infra.
6. See 405 U.S. at 658; notes 17-25 and accompanying text infra.
7. See Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of ParentalRights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527, 529-38 (1975); Comment, Rights of Putative Fathers in
Custody and Adoption Proceedings-Washington's Law in Perspective, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 826,
830-35 (1974). For a discussion of the differing views among the states, see notes 26-65 and
accompanying text infra.

(317)
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two subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Quilloin v. Walcott 8 and Caban
v. Mohammed, 9 these narrower adoption issues have been specifically addressed so that the lower courts and state legislatures have now obtained
sufficient guidance to determine the constitutional rights of the unwed father
in adoption proceedings. 10
This comment will analyze the Stanley decision and the manner in
which the states have responded to this case. 1 It will then examine Quilloin and Caban, considering the consistency of these decisions with Stanley, 1 2 the effects which these two cases may have on state statutes and decisions handed down in response to Stanley,'13 and their potential effect on the
adoption of newborns. 1 4 Finally, this comment will suggest that sufficient
guidelines are now available such that those portions of the Pennsylvania
Adoption Act declared unconstitutional in Adoption of Walker 15 can now be
16
rewritten to comply with the requirements of the Federal Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Stanley v. Illinois and Its Impact
In Stanley, the natural father of three illegitimate children challenged
the constitutionality of an Illinois statute which declared illegitimate children
wards of the state upon their mother's death. 1 7 The Stanleys had lived together intermittently for eighteen years and, during this period, the father
had actively supported the three children, whose paternity he did not dispute.'
Upon the death of the mother, dependency proceedings were initiated under the Illinois statute and the children were declared wards of the
8. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
9. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
10. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 385-87, 391-94; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at
247, 253-56.
11. See notes 17-65 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 66-109 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 110-23 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 124-46 and accompanying text infra.
15. 468 Pa. 165, 170-71, 360 A.2d 603, 606 (1976). For a discussion of Walker, see notes
147-49 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 150-61 and accompanying text infra.
17. 405 U.S.at 646. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-14, 702-1, -5 (Smith-Hurd 1972)
(current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)). The Illinois law
set forth a dependency proceeding under which the state was able to have a minor child declared a ward of the state by proving that the child had no surviving parents, guardian, or legal
custodian. Id. Because the Illinois statute defined "parent" as "the father and mother of a
legitimate child, . . . or the natural mother of an illegitimate child," it was clear that unwed
fathers were not included in this statutory definition. Id. § 701-14 (current version at ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)). Therefore, if the only surviving parent was
the unwed natural father, a child would be deemed to have no surviving parent and would
become a ward of the state, Id. §§ 701-14, 702-5 (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §
701-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)). The provision which defines "parent" has since been changed
to mean "the father or mother of a legitimate child, or illegitimate child." Act of Sept. 6, 1973,
Pub. A. No. 78-531, § 1, 1973 Il. Laws 1503 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)).
18. 405 U.S. at 646, 651 n.4.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss2/4

2

Gutekunst: An Analysis of the Unwed Father's Adoption Rights in Light of Cab

1979-1980]
state. 19

COMMENT

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the lower court's

holding that the children could be properly separated from their father be20
cause he had never married the children's mother.
In reversing the Illinois courts, the United States Supreme Court held

that "all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their
fitness before their children are removed from their custody." 21 The Court
found that denying a fitness hearing to Stanley, an unwed parent, while
granting a hearing in similar circumstances to other parents, was contrary to
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.2 2 The Stanley

Court further held that the Illinois statute, which was based upon the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit to care for their children, violated the
due process provision of the fourteenth amendment.2 3 The Court reasoned

that the procedural benefits of speed and efficiency to be gained by presuming that the unwed father is unfit did not outweigh the father's right to a
19. Id. at 646.
20. In re Stanley, 45 111.2d 132, 133-35, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815-16 (1970). Stanley argued the
the Illinois law violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution because it
required a showing of unfitness before a child could be taken from married parents or an unwed
mother's custody, but did not require such a showing when a child was to be taken from an
unwed father. Id. at 135, 256 N.E.2d at 815-16.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that Stanley's unfitness as a parent had
never been established, it still rejected the equal protection claim, holding "that Stanley could
properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the dead
mother had not been married." Id. at 134, 256 N.E.2d at 815. In so ruling, the court concluded
that Stanley's actual fitness as a father was irrelevant in this situation. Id. The result of this
holding was such that an unwed father would be subjected to a uniquely simplistic procedure in
which the state could rely upon a presumption of unfitness to remove the children from the
unwed father's custody, thereby avoiding any questions concerning his fitness. See 405 U.S. at
650.
21. 405 U.S. at 658.
22. Id. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CON ST. amend. XIV.
Criticizing the majority's equal protection analysis, the dissent maintained that the equal
protection clause was not violated because the state gave full recognition only to those fatherchild relationships that arose in the context of family units bound by legal obligations arising
from marriage or from adoption proceedings. 405 U.S. at 663-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The
dissent argued that Illinois can constitutionally distinguish between unwed fathers and unwed
mothers because of the state's interest in protecting the welfare of illegitimate children within
its jurisdiction. Id. at 665 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent stressed that ordinarily the
mother is readily identifiable, whereas the unwed father is traditionally difficult to locate or
identify. Id. Additionally, the unwed father generally denies all responsibility, exhibits no interest in the welfare of the child, and in many instances may be unaware of his paternity. Id.
Finally, the dissent emphasized the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing the
offspring, concluding that the mother thereby establishes stronger bonds with the child than
those normally established between the unwed father and the child. Id. This analysis by the
dissent was reinforced by the observable fact that most unwed mothers exhibit a concern for
their offspring, either permanently or until they are safely placed for adoption, while the same
cannot be said of the typical unwed father. Id. at 665-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
therefore concluded that there were no grounds for determining that the Illinois statutory definition of "parent" violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 667 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
23. 405 U.S. at 657-58. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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hearing on his fitness when dismemberment of the family unit is involved. 24 Finally, the Stanley Court suggested in dictum that an unwed
father is entitled to a hearing prior to the termination of his parental rights
when he claims competency and the desire to care for his children.2 5
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Stanley, problems arose
concerning the extent to which the Court's analysis applied to adoption proceedings. 26 While many states granted rights to unwed fathers in adoption
proceedings, 27 the courts differed in their determinations of the nature of
these rights and the class of unwed fathers who could exercise them. 28
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Washington took a broad view of the Stanley
decision and gave fathers of illegitimate children extensive rights. 29 The
Illinois Attorney General took the broadest position, stating that "to effectuate a valid adoption under United States and Illinois law, consent to adoption must be obtained from both the father and mother of an illegitimate
child .... "30 This view led to the Illinois practice of requiring that unwed
fathers be notified and given the opportunity of a hearing as a prerequisite
to the adoption of their children."1 If the father's consent was withheld, or
if his identity was not known, Illinois required that he be made a party
32
defendant in any adoption proceeding.

24. 405 U.S. at 658. The Court, in its due process balancing analysis, emphasized its tradition of protecting the family unit and found that Stanley had a substantial interest in retaining
the custody of his illegitimate children. 405 U.S. at 651-52. The state's interest, on the other
hand, was determined to be the protection of the emotional, physical, and moral welfare of
illegitimate children, and the protection of the best interest of the community. 1d. at 652. The
majority also recognized that the establishment of prompt, efficient procedures to achieve
legitimate state goals is an additional state interest worthy of constitutional protection. Id. at
656. The Court noted, however, that the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency, and that the due process clause was designed to protect citizens from an overbearing
concern by the state for expediency. Id. Consequently, the state's implementation of a procedure which presumed the unwed father's unfitness, though faster and cheaper than a case-bycase determination, was found by the Court to foreclose determination of the issues of competence and care by explicitly ignoring present realities in favor of past history. Id. at 656-57. The
Court thus concluded that such a procedure needlessly risks "running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child," and must, therefore, be declared invalid. Id. at
656-57.
The dissent in Stanley, however, criticized the majority for even considering the due process question because Stanley had never made a due process argument in the lower courts and
the Illinois Supreme Court had not addressed the issue. Id. at 659 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 657 n.9. See also Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After
Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115, 125-26 (1973). See also
Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
26. See Comment, supra note 7, at 830. See also Barron, supra note 7, at 532.
27. See notes 29-65 and accompanying text infra. See also Comment, supra note 7, at 830.
28. See notes 33-42 & 56-65 and accompanying text infra. See also Comment, supra note 7,
at 830-42; Comment, supra note 25, at 126-32.
29. See notes 30-51 and accompanying text infra.
30. 1972 Op. I11. Att'y Gen. 140, 142-43. See also Barron, supra note 7, at 529-30.
31. 1972 Op. Ill. Att'y Gen. at 143.
32. Id. The unknown father was made a party defendant tinder the name of "[a]ll whom it
may concern," and therefore was entitled by statute to notice. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-7
(Smith-Hurd 1975). This Illinois practice was criticized by the Child Welfare League of America
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The broad view taken by the Illinois Attorney General was a result of
both the Stanley decision,3 3 and the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home. 34 In Slawek, the court was faced
with an equal protection challenge to the Illinois Adoption Act, which precluded the father of an illegitimate child from asserting any rights in adoption proceedings. 35 In holding that sections of this Act were unconstitutional under Stanley, 36 the court stated that the interests of the father of
an illegitimate child are the same as those of other parents. 37 The Illinois
court therefore concluded that it is an unreasonable distinction to allow the
mother of an illegitimate child the rights of notice and consent prior to an
adoption, but to deny these rights to the father.3 8
The state of Wisconsin also interpreted the Stanley decision broadly. 39
In Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services,40 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that either consent of both the unwed father and the unwed mother or the
consent of one parent with proper termination of the other's parental rights
was required before adoption. 4 1 In addition, the court held that the notice

on the basis that it unduly delayed the placement of children. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF
AMERICA, THE CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE NEWSLETTER 1, 6 (August 1972). In a meeting of the

Child Welfare League to discuss the implications of Stanley, the following statement was
adopted by the League with respect to the rights of unwed fathers:
At the present time there is no unanimity as to the constitutionally required legal
rights of fathers of children born out of wedlock. There are those who hold that all known
fathers must be notified as part of any action to terminate parental rights, whether voluntary or judicial. others hold that only fathers who have formally or informally acknowledged paternity need to be notified ....
• . . However, as the standard-setting agency in child welfare, the League believes
that in order to protect the best interest of the child, the preferred social policy would be
to involve only those fathers who have either acknowledged paternity or been so adjudicated.
Id. See also Barron, supra note 7, at 530-31.
33. See 1972 Op. Ill. Att'y Gen. at 141-42.
34. 52 IIl. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972). See 1972 Op. Ill. Att'y Gen. at 142.
35. 52 Ill. 2d at 21, 284 N.E.2d at 292.
36. The court ruled that provisions of the Illinois Adoption Act were unconstitutional "insofar as they [were] in conflict with Stanley [and] Rothstein." Id. at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 292. For
a discussion of Rothstein, see note 41 infra. See also Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis.
2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973); notes 40-47 and accompanying text infra.
37. 52 III. 2d at 21, 284 N.E.2d at 292. The trial court had held that Illinois could enact a
statute which allowed an adoption without notice to, or the consent of, the unwed father. Id.
38. id.
39. See Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973); notes 40-47
and accompanying text infra. See also Barron, supra note 7, at 535.
40. 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
41. Id. at 8, 207 N.W.2d at 830. On August 7, 1968, a county court order terminated Karen
Lewis' parental rights over her illegitimate child, and the child was placed in the home of the
prospective adoptive parents. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 421, 178
N.W.2d 56, 57 (1970), vacated sub nora. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051
(1972). The natural father, Jerry Rothstein, had not been given iotice of, nor had he consented
to, the termination of his parental rights. 47 Wis. 2d at 422, 178 N.W.2d at 57. In December of
1968, the father petitioned the county court for ail order vacating the order of August 7, and
granting him a hearing concerning his rights to the custody of his child. Id. Rothstein was
granted a hearing concerning his petition, but the county court refused to receive any evidence

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 4

322

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 25: p. 317

of the termination of the unwed fathers' parental rights must be the same as
that required for married parents or unwed mothers, and that this notice
42
could be either personal or constructive.
Subsequently, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a new statute to deal
with the issues raised by Stanley. 43 Taking an expansive view of Stanley,
the legislature required that notice of adoption proceedings should be served
on the unwed parents and, in those situations where notice by publication is
permitted, the mother's name should be included in the publication if such
inclusion is necessary to give effective notice to the natural father. 4" Alconcerning his fitness to have custody of his illegitimate child. Id. The court held that unwed
fathers have "no right to the custody of their illegitimate children," and therefore denied Rothstein's petition. Id. at 423, 178 N.W.2d at 57. Rothstein took no appeal from the judgment
denying this petition. Id. Subsequently, he petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ
of habeas corpus, in order to determine who had the right of custody to his child. Id. at 421,
178 N.W.2d at 56. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the Wisconsin statutes clearly granted the mother alone the power to terminate parental rights or to veto
the adoption of any child born to her out of wedlock. Id. at 427, 178 N.W.2d at 60. The court
also held that the failure of the statutes to grant notice of a hearing to an unwed father prior to
the termination of his parental rights did not violate the state or federal constitutions because
there was a rational basis for distinguishing between wed and unwed fathers, in that unwed
fathers have consistently shown no interest in their children. Id. at 432, 178 N.W.2d at 62.
Further justification for this classification was that if an unwed father were given such rights, he
might decide to interfere with the adoption process so that prospective adoptive parents will be
discouraged from seeking placement from the agencies. Id. at 433, 178 N.W.2d at 63, citing In
re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965).
This Wisconsin Supreme Court decision was appealed to and vacated by the United States
Supreme Court, with an order that on remand it should be considered in light of the Stanley
decision. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court reconsidered its decision in Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d
826 (1973).
42. 59 Wis. 2d at 8, 207 N.W.2d at 830. The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted Stanley
as holding that
the termination of a natural father's parental rights to a child born out of wedlock without
actual notice to him, if he was known, and without giving him the right to be heard on
the termination of his rights denied him due process of law.
Id. at 4-5, 207 N.W.2d at 828. Relying on this interpretation of Stanley, and the fact that there
could not be a valid adoption without the proper termination of parental rights, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court concluded that the Wisconsin statutes regulating the termination of parental
rights were unconstitutional because a more adequate procedure of notice was required prior to
the termination of an unwed father's parental rights. Id. at 8, 207 N.W.2d at 829-30.
43. Act of June 15, 1974, ch. 263, § 12, 1973 Wis. Laws 771 (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. §
48.84(3) (West 1979)). See Barron, supra note 7, at 535-36. The Wisconsin statute provides that
"[t]he consent of the father of a minor born out of wedlock and not subsequently legitimated or
adopted shall be necessary unless his rights have been legally terminated." Wis. STAT. ANN. §
48.84(3) (West 1979). The statute also requires that a hearing be held before the court may
terminate any parental rights. Id. § 48.42(1).
44. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.41(1) (West 1979). This statute provides:
The termination of parental rights . . . shall be made only after a hearing before the
court. The court shall have notice of the time, place and purpose of the hearing served on
the parents personally at least 10 days prior to the date of the hearing. If the court is
satisfied that personal service , . . cannot be effected, then such notice may be given by
registered mail. . . . If notice by registered mail is not likely to be effective, the court
may order notice to be given by publication. . . . If notice is given by publication, the
name of the mother shall be included in such notice only if the court following a hearing
... determines in any termination proceeding that such inclusion is essential to give
effective notice to the natural father.
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though Wisconsin did not require that the mother testify to the whereabouts
and identity of the father, 4 5 other proposals, such as the Uniform Parentage
Act, 46 have included such extensive requirements in order to assure proper
47
notice to the unwed father.
In addition to Illinois and Wisconsin, the State of Washington also took
a broad view of Stanley.4 8 The Washington legislature amended its adop4 9
tion statute and gave unwed fathers the same rights as unwed mothers.
Under the new act, the consent of the unwed father was required before

45. Id.
46. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1-25, reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 521-42 (Supp.
1979).
47. See Barron, supra note 7, at 537. Section 24 of the Unform Parentage Act provides in
pertinent part:
(a) If a mother relinquishes or proposes to relinquish for adoption a child who has (1) a
presumed father . . . (2) a father whose relationship to the child has been determined by
a court, or (3) a father as to whom a child is a legitimate child . . ., the father shall be
given notice of the adoption proceeding . . . unless the father's relationship to the child
has been previously terminated or determined by a court not to exist.
(c) In an effort to identify the natural father, the court shall cause inquiry to be madeof
the mother....
(d) If, after inquiry, the natural father is identified to the satisfaction of the court, or if
more than one man is identified as a possible father, each shall be given notice of the
proceeding.
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 24, reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAWs ANN. 538-39 (Supp. 1979). See
Barron, supra note 7, at 537.
The Uniform Act also provides that the failure of a witness or a party to testify is equivalent
to civil contempt. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 10(b). Therefore, if the mother in a Uniform Act
jurisdiction would refuse to identify the father, the court could compel her testimony under the
threat of civil contempt. See id.; Barron, supra note 7, at 537. The principle draftsman of the
Uniform Act, Professor Krause, has supported this approach, stating:
[The Act's] guiding principle is full equality for all children, legitimate and illegitimate, in
their legal relationships with both parents (9 1, 2). Moreover, the Act emphasizes the
right in question is the right of the child (9 6(a), 9)-not the right of his mother as
current state laws insist. Accordingly, the mother may not stand in the child's way and, if
necessary, may be compelled to tesify as to the father's identity and whereabouts-just as
any other witness (§ 10(b)).
Krause, Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8 (1974), quoted in Barron, supra note 7, at
538. Another commentator, however, has been critical of the Uniform Act and the Wisconsin
approach because extensive notice requirements delay the adoption process, and because notice
by publication is not likely to reveal the identity of the natural father even if the mother's name
is used. See Barron, supra note 7, at 538.
48. See Comment, supra note 7, at 834.
49. Act of Mar. 20, 1973, ch. 134, § 2, 1973 Wash. Laws 396 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.32.030(2) (Supp. 1979)). The prior Washington statute only required the consent of
the mother if the child being adopted was illegitimate. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.030(3)
(1961). The revised statute provides that "if the person to be adopted is a minor, then [consent
to the adoption must be given] by each of his living parents ... " WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.32.030(2) (Supp. 1979). However, consent to the adoption of a minor is not required 1) when
a parent has been deprived of the custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction; and
2) when a parent has neither acknowledged parentage nor attempted to establish a relationship
with the child as required by the statute. Id. § 26.32.040(2), (5).
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adoption, 50 and comprehensive notice procedures were established to notify
51
all unwed fathers of the pendency of adoption and custody proceedings.
There are, however, states which have taken a narrow view of Stan54
53
52
With respect to the notice issue, Minnesota and South Dakota
ley.
enacted legislation which does not require the state to afford notice to the
unwed father unless he has taken some form of affirmative action in recognizing or supporting the child. 55 New York also construed Stanley narrowly, 56 as is evidenced by two principal cases: Doe v. Department of Social
Services 5 7 and Adoption of Malpica-Orsini.5 8
50.

WASH. REV.

CODE ANN.

51.

WASH. REV.

CODE ANN.

§ 26.32.030(2) (Supp. 1979). See note 49 supra.
§ 26.32.085. The statute provides in pertinent part:

The following requirements regarding notice of hearing on a petition for adoption
shall apply to an alleged parent of a child who has not acknowledged the relationship and
action has not been taken to establish such relationship .. .and who has not consented to
the adoption of such child:
(1) Where the court has reason to believe or suspect that any person not before the
court is or might be the parent of such child, the court shall direct the clerk to issue the
notice prescribed in .. . this section to such person.
Id.
52. See note 53-65 and accompanying text infra.
53. Act of Feb. 21, 1974, ch. 66, H.F. No. 2332, 1974 Minn. Laws 91-93 (codified at MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 259-26 (West Supp. 1979)).
54. Act of Feb. 20, 1974, ch. 176, 1974 S.D. Laws 303 (codified at S.D. COMP. LAWs ANN.
§25-6-1.1 (1976)).
55. The Minnesota statute provides that notice of a hearing for adoption shall be given to
the parent of an illegitimate child only if
(a) The person's name appears on the child's birth certificate, as a parent, or
(b) The person has substantially supported the child, or
(c) The person either was married to the person designated on the birth certificate as
the natural mother within 325 days before the child's birth, or married that person within
the ten days after the child's birth or
(d) The person is openly living with the child or the person designated on the birth
certificate as the natural mother of the child, or both, or
(e) The person has been adjudicated the child's parent, or
(f) The person has filed an affidavit [stating his intention to retain parental rights
within 90 days of the child's birth or within 60 days of the child's placement with prospective adoptive parents, whichever is sooner] ....
MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 259.26 (West Supp. 1979).

The South Dakota statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or court rule the father of an illegitimate child
shall, as a requirement of due process, have no rights to the service of process in adoption, dependency, delinquency, or termination of parental rights proceedings unless he is
known and identified by the mother or unless he, prior to the entry of a final order, in
any of the three proceedings, shall have acknowledged the child as his own by affirmatively asserting paternity, within sixty days after the birth of the child,
(1) as outlined in § 25-6-1, or
(2) by causing his name to be affixed to the birth certificate .. . or
(3) otherwise by commencing a judicial proceeding claiming a parental right.
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-1.1 (1976). Section 25-6-1 of the South Dakota statute provides that "[tihe father of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such into his family .. . and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child,
thereby adopts it as such .... S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 25-6-1 (1976).
56. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text infra; Comment, supra note 7, at 831.
57. 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1972).
58. 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, appeal dismissed sub non. Orsini v.
Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1977).
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In Doe, the Supreme Court of Dutchess County held that, in light of
Stanley, the New York Adoption Statute must be construed to mean "that
the mother's exclusive or sole consent suffices only where there has been no
formal or unequivocal acknowledgment or recognition of paternity by the
father." 59 While the court found that the father's consent was not a condition precedent to adoption of his illegitimate child, it stated that the unwed
father, who has unequivocally acknowledged or recognized paternity, is entitled to notice so that he may appear at the hearing and present facts to aid
80
the court in its determination of what is in the best interests of the child.
Following the Doe decision, New York's highest court upheld the
constitutionality of the state's adoption law in Malpica-Orsini.61 As in Doe,
paternity was not disputed in Malpica-Orsini.62 Thus, the.New York Court
of Appeals approved the procedure which required that the unwed father be
given notice of the adoption proceedings as well as the opportunity to be
heard on the issue of what was in the best interests of the child.8 3 Therefore, it appears that the New York courts interpreted Stanley as guaranteeing
an unwed father 1) notice of the proceedings to terminate his parental rights,
and 2) the right to be heard concerning the child's best interests-at least in
cases where paternity was not in dispute. Nevertheless, unlike some
states,6 4 New York did not read Stanley to require the unwed father's con6 5
sent as a prerequisite to the adoption.
59. 71 Misc. 2d at 671, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 107. In Doe, the natural father, who had previously
been adjudicated to be the father of the offspring by the family court sought to block the
adoption of his child. Id. at 666-67, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04. At the time of his suit, the New
York Domestic Relations Law only required the consent of the unwed mother and, by omission,
denied the father any rights. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111(3) (McKinney 1977). See 71 Misc. 2d
at 671, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
60. 71 Misc. 2d at 671, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 107. In its rationale, the court stated that Stanley
totally revised previous law which had held that the unwed father had no right to custody and
that his consent to the adoption was unnecessary. Id. at 668, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 104. The court
concluded that it would be erroneous to hold that a man who acknowledged fathering a child
would have no rights, such as being notified prior to the adoption of his children. Id. at 670,
337 N.Y.S.2d at 106. Although the court recognized that adoptions may be delayed, it stated
that when there is no issue as to the father's paternity, no undue burden would be imposed by
requiring that an unwed father be notified of the impending adoption of his child. Id.
61. 36 N.Y.2d at 577-78, 331 N.E.2d at 492-93, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520-21. In Malpica-Orsini,
the child was born in 1970, and the unwed parents lived together with the child until June,
1972. Id. at 569, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513. In September, 1972, the unwed
father was adjudicated by the family court to be the father of the child, was directed to pay
support, and was granted visitation rights. Id. The mother subsequently married and her husband petitioned for the adopton of her illegitimate child. Id. In response to this petition, the
unwed father moved for an order enforcing his visitation rights and affording him notice and an
opportunity to be heard in all proceedings involving his child. Id. Although the court granted
the father an opportunity to be heard, the adoption was permitted over his objection. Id. at
570, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
62. Compare 71 Misc. 2d at 667, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 104 with 36 N.Y.2d at 569, 331 N.E.2d at
487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513. In cases where there has been no formal or unequivocal acknowledgment or recognition of paternity by the father, New York would consider the mother's unilateral consent to be sufficient. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
63. 36 N.Y.2d at 578, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
64. See notes 30-38 & 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
65. 36 N.Y.2d at 576-77, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519-21. In reaching this
conclusion, the majority in Malpica-Orsini, after analyzing the private and state interests, con-
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B. The Quilloin v. Walcott Decision
Faced with these various state interpretations of Stanley, the United
States Supreme Court, in 1978, considered a challenge to the constitutionality of Georgia's adoption laws .66 In Quilloin, an illegitimate child
lived with his mother and his mother's spouse, who later petitioned to adopt
the child. 6 7 In response to the adoption petition, the natural father filed a
legitimation petition which was denied as not being in the best interests of
the child. 68 The adoption was subsequently granted over his objections. 69
The applicable Georgia statute required only the consent of the unwed
mother prior to the adoption of the illegitimate child. 70 Under this statute
an unwed father had power to veto the adoption of his child only after
legitimating the child either by marrying the mother and acknowledging the
child as his own,

71

or by obtaining from the court an order declaring the

child legitimate and capable of inheriting from him. 72 The unwed father in
(juilloin claimed, however, that he was constitutionally entitled to an abso73
lute power to veto the adoption of his child.
cluded that there were sufficient compelling state interests to justify a difference in classification
between wed and unwed fathers. Id. at 574-77, 331 N.E.2d at 490-92, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517-20.
The state interests discussed by the court were the welfare of the child, the potential for extortion, the efficient operation of the adoption process, and the fostering of marriage hetween the
unwed mother and a potential adoptive father. Id. at 572-73, 331 N.E.2d at 489-90, 370
N.Y.S.2d at 516-17. The dissent, however, concluded that the statute violated the equal protection clause, not because there were no compelling state interests, but because there were less
burdensome alternatives for achieving these objectives. Id. at 586, 331 N.E.2d at 499, 370
N.Y.S.2d at 528 (Jones, J., dissenting). Here the statute categorically denied all unmarried
fathers the right to consent to the adoption of their children, and therefore the defect, according
to the dissent, was that the statute excluded loving, attentive, and faithful fathers. Id. at 586-87,
331 N.E.2d at 499, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 529-30 (Jones, J., dissenting).
66. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
67. Id. at 247. The child was eleven years old at the time the adoption petition was filed.
id.
68. Id. In objecting to the adoption, the unwed father also attempted to secure visitation
rights. Id. He did not, however, attempt to seek custody of the child nor did he object to the
child continuing to live with his mother and her husband. Id.
69. Id. The Court noted at the outset that this was not a case in which the sufficiency of the
unwed father's notice of the adoption proceeding was being challenged. Id. at 253. Here, the
natural father had been afforded a full hearing on the legitimation petition, at which time he
was given every opportunity to offer evidence on relevant matters including his fitness as a
parent. Id.
70. Id. Section 74-403(3) of the then-applicable Georgia Code provided: "If the child be
illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice." GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973)
(current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(a) (Supp. 1979)). The Court noted that tinder this
statute, even when a child's parents had been divorced or separated at the time of the adoption
proceedings, either parent had the right to veto the adoption. 434 U.S. at 248. This statute has
subsequently been changed to provide that "no adoption of a child with a living parent(s) . . .
shall be permitted except where (1) the parent(s) . . . of the child has voluntarily and in writing
surrendered all of his rights to the child . . . or the parent(s) . . . of the child has had his rights
terminated by order of a court .... " GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(a) (Supp. 1979).
71. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101 (1973).
72. Id. § 74-103. See 434 U.S. at 248-49. Under the applicable Georgia law, unless the
father legitimated the child, the mother remained the only recognized parent and had exclusive
authority to exercise parental prerogatives, which included consent to the child's adoption. GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1973) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (Snpp. 1979)).
73. 434 U.S. at 250.
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The United States Supreme Court first considered whether the rights of
the unwed father in Quilloin were adequately protected by a "best interests
of the child" standard. 74 Noting that this was not a situation where the
unwed father had at any time sought actual custody of the child, and that
the child would be placed with his existing family unit, the Court concluded
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was satisfied in this
75
case by the best interests test.
Since a married or divorced father had the right to veto the adoption of
his child, while an unwed father did not have this right,76 the Quilloin Court
next considered whether such a classification scheme violated the equal protection clause. 77 While recognizing that the unwed father is subject to essentially the same support obligations as a married or divorced father, 78 the
Court noted that, here, the unwed father had never exercised actual or legal
custody of the child, nor had he accepted any significant responsibility with
respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of his offspring. 79 The Court therefore concluded that since there was a difference
between the unwed father in Quilloin and a married or divorced father, the
state could justifiably grant the married or divorced father the power to veto
the adoption of his child while, at the same time, deny that right to the
unwed father.8 0

C. The Caban v. Mohammed Decision
Shortly after its decision in Quilloin, the Supreme Court in Caban
heard an unwed father's challenge to the constitutionality of section 111 of
the New York Domestic Relations Law, 8 ' which allowed illegitimate children
74. 1d. at 254. The "best interests of the child" test began to gain prominence in the case of
Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. 1977). This
is a flexible test which permits consideration of the peculiar facts of each case. Id. The test
does, however, require the judge, "recognizing human frailty and man's limitations with respect
to forecasting the future course of human events, to make an informed and rational judgment,
free of bias and favor, as to the least detrimental of the available alternatives." Id.
75. 434 U.S. at 255. The Court stated that the due process clause would be offended "if a
State were to attempt to force the break-up of a natural family, over the objection of the parents
and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest." Id., quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
76. See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(a)
(Supp. 1979)).
77. 434 U.S. at 255-56. For the text of the equal protection clause, see note 22 supra. The
Court noted that it was not required to consider the constitutionality of the gender-based discrimination implicit in the statute because the unwed father had failed to present that issue in
his jurisdictional statement. 434 U.S. at 253 n.13.
78. 434 U.S. at 256.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 441 U.S. at 381. This section of the New York Adoption Act was tile same section that
was disputed in both Malpica-Orsini and Doe, except that the statutory numbering had been
changed. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 111.1(c) (McKinney 1977). For a discussion of MalpicaOrsini and Doe, see notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra. Section 111 of the Adoption Act
provided that "consent to adoption shall be required as follows: ... (c) Of the mother, whether
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to be adopted by their natural mother and stepfather without the natural
father's consent.8 2 The unwed father in Caban, unlike the father in Quilloin, had maintained substantial contacts with his illegitimate children.8 3
For example, besides having lived with the natural mother for several years,
the unwed father in Caban had participated in the care and support of the
children. 8 4 Thus, the Caban Court held that section 111 of the New York
statute 8 5 was "another example of overbroad generalizations in gender-based
classifications" because the distinction drawn between unmarried fathers and
unmarried mothers bore no substantial relationship to the state's interest in
86
providing adoptive homes to illegitimate children.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the same contention
which had been raised in Malpica-Orsini87 that, since it is often impossible
to locate the unwed father, requiring his consent to the adoption would hinder and discourage adoptions of illegitimate children. 8 8 The Court stated

adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111.1 (c) (McKinney 1977).
The unwed father's challenge in Caban included two claims: 1) that the distinction drawn
by the statute between unwed fathers and other parents violated the equal protection clause;
and 2) that Quilloin recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain their parental relationship with their children absent a determination of unfitness. 441 U.S. at 385. In
Caban, as in Quilloin, the unwed father had received due notice and had participated in the
adoption proceedings; thus, he did not argue that due process as required by Stanley had been
denied. Id. at n.3.
82. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111.1(c) (McKinney 1977).
83. Compare 441 U.S. at 393 with 434 U.S. at 256. See notes 75-80 and accompanying text
supra.
84. 441 U.S. at 382. The unwed parents had lived together from 1968 to 1973 and, throughout this period, they had represented themselves as being husband and wife. The appellant
appeared as the father on the birth certificates of each of their two children, and he lived with
and contributed to the support of these children as their father until 1973. Id. Between 1973
and 1976, the children were for a period of time in the custody of the appellant, but the mother
was subsequently given temporary custody through the court order. Id. at 383.
85. This issue arose in the New York courts after the natural mother and her husband had
filed a petition for adoption of her children. Id. The unwed father then cross-petitioned for
adoption, and a hearing before the surrogate was held concerning both of these petitions. Id.
The surrogate granted the petition of the mother and her husband, effectively cutting off all of
the unwed father's parental rights. Id. This decision was affirmed by the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, which stated that the constitutional challenge to § 111 of the Adoption Act was precluded by the earlier New York decision in Malpica-Orsini. In re David, A.C.,
56 A.D.2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (1976). See notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra.
The New York Court of Appeals similarly affirmed. In re David, A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 709, 372
N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977).
86. 441 U.S. at 394. In reaching its decision, the Court addressed the question of whether
the distinction between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers bears a substantial relationship to an important state interest. Id. at 388. The mother argued that the underlying rationale
for the statute was that the maternal role in child raising is almost always more important than
the paternal role. Id. Although the court found that mothers as a class were generally closer to
newborns, it stated that this generalization becomes a less acceptable basis for legislative distinction as the child's age increases. Id. at 389. The Court therefore concluded that a broad
gender-based distinction is not justified by any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations with the child at every phase of development. Id.
87. See N.Y.2d at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
88. 441 U.S. at 390-91.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss2/4

12

Gutekunst: An Analysis of the Unwed Father's Adoption Rights in Light of Cab

1979-1980]

COMMENT

that "[i]n those cases where the father never has come forward to participate
in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes
the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of
that child."'8 9 The Court noted, however, that in cases such as Caban,
"where the father has established a substantial relationship with the child
and has admitted his paternity, a state should have no difficulty in identifying the father even of children born out of wedlock." 90 As a result, the
Court found that there was no showing here that the different treatment
given unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers under section 111 had a
substantial relationship to the state's interest in promoting the adoption of
illegitimate children. 91 Thus, the Court concluded that the effect of the
New York statute was "to [unconstitutionally] discriminate against unwed
fathers .. . when their identity is known and they have manifested a sig-

nificant parental interest in the child."
III.

92

ANALYSIS OF THE LAW AFTER CABAN V. MOHAMMED

A. The Consistency of Caban, Quilloin, and Stanley
In order to analyze what rights the unwed father may have under this
trilogy of Supreme Court decisions, it is suggested that initially the consistency of the holdings must be analyzed. A superficial reading of the Caban
and Quilloin opinions suggests that the cases are contradictory. 9 3 In Quilloin, the Supreme Court upheld the application of a statute which required
that only the mother must consent to the adoption of her illegitimate child, 94
while in Caban a similar statute was held to violate the equal protection

89. Id. at 392. While the Court recognized that the state's interest in providing for the best
interests of illegitimate children is important, it nevertheless found that New York's statute
violated the equal protection clause because the statute's gender-based discrimination did not
bear a fair and substantial relationship to this interest. Id. at 390-92, 394.
Justices Stewart and Stevens dissented from the majority's equal protection analysis. 441
U.S. at 398-400 (Stewart, J.,dissenting); 441 U.S. at 409-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart contended that the statute did not violate the equal protection clause because the discriminatory classification was not between similarly situated persons. Id. at 398-99 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). The mother's position differs from the father's, according to Justice Stewart, in that
it is the mother who carries and bears the child, as compared to the father, who in the vast
majority of cases, is uninterested, unavailable, or unknown. Id. at 399 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
This argument was also the basis for Justice Stevens' dissent. See id. at 409 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). His interpretation of the majority opinion was that because the reasons for the
classification rule were not as strong for a small part of the disadvantaged class of unwed fathers
as they were for the vast majority of the class, the statute was held to be invalid under the
equal protection clause. Id. Justice Stevens argued that an otherwise valid classification should
not be ruled invalid merely because such a classification leads to an arbitrary decision in an
isolated case. Id. at 411-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 393. Cf. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 256 (Court refused to recognize father's
right to veto adoption when he lacked established relationship with his child).
91. 441 U.S. at 393.
92. Id. at 394.
93. See notes 70, 75, 80 & 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 66-80 and accompanying text supra.
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clause.9 5 There are, however, critical distinctions between the facts of Quilloin and Caban.
The factual situation in Quilloin presented none of the substantial contacts between the unwed father and his child which the Caban Court considered essential to its holding. 96 In Quilloin the unwed father had taken no
action to legitimatize the child during eleven ycars of the child's life, and
had never accepted any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
care or supervision of the child. 97 From the Court's analysis of these facts,
it can be concluded that only when a substantial relationship has been established between the unwed father and his illegitimate child, and only when
the father has admitted paternity, will the application of a statute denying
him the right to veto adoption be held unconstitutional. 98 Accordingly, it is
suggested that if such substantial contacts between the unwed father and his
child had existed in Quilloin, the application of that statute would have
paralleled the application of the statute in Caban.99
It is additionally suggested that Quilloin and Caban are consistent with
Stanley, although these cases are more difficult to reconcile because the relevant holding in Stanley was narrow, determining only that an unwed father
had the right to a fitness hearing prior to the removal of his children from
his custody. 10 0 Since the Stanley decision did not deal with the consent
issue in adoption proceedings, it is suggested that it should not be read as
requiring consent in all adoption situations. 1' 1 Consequently, the Court's
decisions in Quilloin and Caban, which grant the right to veto the adoption
only to those unwed fathers who have established a relationship with their
children, are not inconsistent with the holding of Stanley.
Moreover, it is submitted that Quilloin and Caban followed the dictum
in Stanley which suggested that unwed fathers who claim competency and
who desire to care for their children are entitled to notice 102 and a hearing
prior to the termination of their parental rights. 10 3 Since adoption proceed95. See notes 81-92 and accompanying text supra.
96. See notes 78-80 & 83-92 and accompanying text supra. Another factual distinction between Quilloin and Caban, was that in Quilloin the natural father was merely trying to block
the adoption, while in Caban, the father actually petitioned to adopt the child himself. Coinpare 434 U.S. at 247 with 441 U.S. at 383.
97. 434 U.S. at 254 n.14, 256. See notes 75 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
98. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
99. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text supra.
100. 405 U.S. at 658. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
101. 405 U.S. at 646-59. See notes 21-25 and accompanying text supra.
102. The extent of the Stanley notice requirement was not addressed by either the Caban or
Quilloin Courts. See 441 U.S. at 385 n.3, 434 U.S. at 253. In Quilloin, the Court observed that
the unwed father had not challenged the sufficiency of his notice with respect to the adoption
hearings. 434 U.S. at 253. Notice was also not an issue in Caban because the unwed father had
actually received due notice and had been a party to the adoption proceedings. 441 U.S. at 385
n.3.

103. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9. See note 25 and accompanying text supra. Although, technically,
this is dictum in the Stanley opinion, there is an indication that the United States Supreme
Court relied on this dictum in remanding Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051
(1972). In that case, the unwed mother had had custody of the child prior to the termination of
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ings include the termination of parental rights with respect to the adopted
child,' 0 4 it would appear that the Stanley dictum would apply to such proceedings. 10 5 In circumstances such as those presented in Quilloin, where
the unwed father had not established substantial contacts, the Court held
that the adoption would be controlled by the "best interests of the child"
test. 10 6 The Court, by holding that this test should apply, contemplated
that a hearing would be held in order to make the "best interests" determination, and that the father could participate in this hearing. Furthermore, in
Quilloin the unwed father's actions seeking to legitimate the child, to obtain
visitation rights, and to block the adoption, were indicative of the unwed
father's desire to care for the child. 10 7 Thus, it is suggested that the Quilloin Court followed the Stanley dictum by requiring a "best interests" hearing prior to the termination of the unwed father's parental rights.
Similarly, in Caban, where substantial contacts did exist, the unwed
father was entitled to an absolute veto of the adoption, which necessarily
implies that the unwed father will be notified of the adoption proceedings.' 0 8 Indeed, the Caban facts indicate that the unwed father was competent to care for his children, and his efforts to care for and adopt his children
are indicative of his desire to care for them.' 09 It is submitted, therefore,
that the hearing requirements raised by the Stanley dictum were also complied with in Caban.
B. The Rights of the Unwed Father in Adoption Proceedings
In dealing with the issue of whether unwed fathers have the right to
veto the adoption of their children, the critical factor is whether the father has
established contacts with the child." 0 If sufficient contacts have not been
established, the consent of the unwed father is not required and the controlling test will be the court's determination of what is in the best interests of
the child."' In those situations, however, where the unwed father has esher parental rights and before the child was given to the adoptive parents. See note 41 supra.
The unwed father's parental rights were also terminated, but he was given no notice of this
termination nor had he consented to such a termination. See note 41 supra. The Supreme
Court, in remanding Rothstein, stated that this case should be further considered in light of
Stanley. 405 U.S. at 1051. Because Stanley's narrow holding was that "all Illinois parents are
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from
their custody," it is suggested that the Supreme Court must have relied on this dictum in
deciding to remand Rothstein. See 405 U.S. at 658.
104. See Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 5-6, 207 N.W.2d 826, 829 (1973)
(custody of child in divorce proceeding can be granted without terminating parental rights; in
adoption proceedings, granting custody requires termination of parental rights).
105. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 74-80 and accompanying text supra.
107. 434 U.S. at 247, 250.
108. See notes 83-92 and accompanying text supra.
109. 441 U.S. at 382-83.
110. See notes 83-92 and accompanying text supra.
111. See notes 75-80 & 106 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the "best
interests" test, see note 74 supra.
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tablished substantial contacts with the child, the best interests test is not
enough to protect the father's rights; 112 he and the child's mother must both
113
consent to the adoption of their child.
Therefore, it is suggested that those states which enacted legislation in
the belief that Stanley required every unwed father to have the right to veto
the adoption of his illegitimate child, regardless of the contacts existing between the father and the child, were too liberal in their interpretation of
Stanley. 114 While granting such expansive rights to unwed fathers is probably not constitutionally infirm, it is suggested that the practical result of this
approach is to seriously impede state adoption procedures. 115 It is further
suggested that this impediment to the state's compelling interest of fostering
an efficient adoption procedure, while not sufficient to outweigh the unwed
father's rights when substantial contacts are established, is sufficient when
such substantial contacts are not present."16
The dictum in Stanley suggests that unwed fathers who claim competency and a desire to care for their children are entitled to notice and a
hearing prior to the termination of their parental rights. 117 The Stanley
Court, in setting forth this dictum, approved the Illinois notice procedures
then in effect. 118 These procedures provided for personal service when the
father was known, and for service by publication when the father was unknown. 119 Therefore, based on the Court's approval of these procedures in
Stanley, it is submitted that those states which did not assume any affirmative obligation to notify the unwed father, unless the unwed father satisfied
certain criteria, may not have extended Stanley far enough. 120 On the other
hand, it is also submitted that statutes such as Wisconsin's and the Uniform
112. See notes 83-92 & 108 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 83-88 & 90-92 and accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 30-38 & 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
115. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 389-91; Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d at
572-74, 331 N.E.2d at 489-91, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17; Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47
Wis. 2d 420, 433, 178 N.W.2d 56, 63 (1970).
116. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 389-91.
117. See notes 25 & 102-07 and accompanying text supra.
118. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37 §§ 704--3, -4 (Smith-Hurd 1972)(current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 704-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)). Based on these
notice procedures, the Court stated that those unwed fathers who were entitled to notice could
not complain if, due to the lack of a prompt response on their part, their children were declared
wards of the state. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
119. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 704-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)). The constructive notice procedure required that the
announcement be directed to "[a]ll whom it may concern" and there was no provision to include the mother's name in the announcement. Id. This notice procedure is very similar to the
notice required by the Illinois statute for adoption proceedings. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4,
§ 9.1-7 (Smith-Hurd 1975).
120. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the unwed father can
do less than is required by these state statutes and still be afforded the right to notice under the
Stanley dictum. For example, while the Minnesota statute requires substantial support of the
child before the unwed father will be entitled to notice, the Stanley criteria of "desire to care"
and "claiming competency" may be satisfied by a petition for visitation or a petition to block the
adoption. Therefore, it is suggested that the Stanley dictum requires less affirmative action by
the unwed father for his right of notice to ripen than do these particular state statutes.
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Parentage Act, which provide for extraordinary notice procedures, 121 are not
required by the holdings of the Supreme Court. Such extensive notice procedures, it is suggested, unnecessarily delay the adoption process, thereby
discouraging prospective adoptive parents. 122 Moreover, it is suggested that
compelling the mother to disclose the identity of the child's father may un123
constitutionally infringe upon the mother's right to privacy.
C. The Newborn Adoptee
An issue specifically not addressed by the Supreme Court in Caban was
the extent of the unwed parent's rights when the adopted child is a newborn. 124 In both Quilloin and Caban, the children involved were older
children with whom an unwed parent had had the opportunity to establish
sufficient contacts. 125 In the newborn situation, however, the opportunities
to establish these substantial contacts are minimal. 126 Furthermore, because newborn children are the easiest to place, 127 the interests of the parents vis-a-vis those of the state may weigh differently.' 12
Here the mother
is readily identifiable, and, having carried the child through the pregnancy,
she has established emotional and psychological ties to the newborn. 129 The
father, if unknown, has not established these ties, and because any attempt
to notify him would probably be ineffective,' 30 a notice requirement would
unnecessarily delay the placement of these children at a time when their
opportunities for adoption are the greatest. 1 3 1 Thus, it has been suggested

121. See notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
122. See cases cited note 115 supra.
123. At least one federal district court has suggested that the unwed mother may be compelled to disclose the identity of the father when receiving welfare funds. Doe v. Norton, 365 F.
Supp. 65, 69, 77-78, 84 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975)
(vacated and remanded for consideration with respect to new social security requirements).
However, because the district court opinion was vacated without any Supreme Court illumination on the privacy issue, the resolution of this issue may still be in doubt. See Roe v. Norton,
422 U.S. 391, 392-93 (1975). One commentator, in discussing Norton, has suggested that compelling the mother to identify the father in the context of whether the mother should be deprived of government funds, is different from the situation where the mother's refusal to identify
the father may harm the child's opportunities for adoption. See Barron, supra note 7, at 541.
Thus, it is suggested that, in the adoption situation, the mother's right to privacy may militate
against compelling her to identify the father. See id. at 542.
124. 441 U.S. at 392 n.ll. Because the issue was not before it, the Caban Court expressed
no view as to whether the distinction between newborn adoptees and older adoptees would
justify more stringent statutory requirements for unwed fathers. Id.
125. See notes 67-68 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
126. See 441 U.S. at 392.
127. See id. at 404 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 403-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 404-05 & n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. See Barron, supra note 7, at 538.
131. Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Barron, supra note 7, at 538.
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that a different test should be established for the newborn adoptee situa-

tion. 132
It is submitted, however, that Caban's "substantial contacts" test can be
successfully applied to many newborn adoptee situations in the same manner
as it is applied in cases involving older children. 133 Accordingly, if the
unwed father, upon learning of the unwed mother's pregnancy, 134 provides
financial assistance to her during the pregnancy, then arguably the substantial contacts required by Caban are present.1 3 5 In this situation, it is submitted that the father is identifiable and has established with the child the
maximum possible ties which can be accomplished prior to birth. 136 Therefore, the unwed father's right to veto any adoption has vested.13 7 Since
Caban can be logically applied in this situation, it is suggested that the "substantial contacts" analysis may be used as the controlling test in such a
case. 138

132. See 441 U.S. 392 & n.ll. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Caban, spoke strongly on this
issue of whether the unwed father's consent should be required for the adoption of a newborn.
Id. at 403-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To indicate the substantial differences which exist between an unwed mother and an unwed father, Justice Stevens began by stating that since the
mother carries the child, only she has the constitutional right to decide whether to bear it or
not. Id. at 404-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The mother, according to Justice Stevens, may be
the only person who knows who sired the child, and may even withhold this information from
the father. Id. Moreover, from conception through infancy, it is the mother who will be faced
with the day-to-day decisions on how to best care for the child, while the father may not even
be known or locatable. Id. at 405. These natural differences between the unmarried father and
unmarried mother make it most probable that it will be the mother who has custody of the
child. Id. Justice Stevens therefore concluded that at birth and immediately thereafter, the
differences between the unwed father and the unwed mother support different statutory treatment. Id. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. See notes 83-92 and accompanying text supra.
134. A Michigan statute attempts to ensure protection for the unwed father even before his
illegitimate child is born. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 710.34 (Supp. 1979). This section
provides:
(1) In order to provide due notice at the earliest possible time to a putative father who
may have an interest in the custody of an expected child or in the mother's intended
release of an expected child for adoption of the expected child, and in order to faciltate
early placement of a child for adoption, a woman pregnant out of wedlock may file . . . an
ex parte petition which evidences her interest to release her expected child for adoption
. .. which indicates the approximate date and location of conception and the expected
date of her confinement, which alleges that a particular person is the putative father of
her expected child, and which request the court to notify the putative father about his
rights to file a notice of interest to claim paternity ...
(2) A notice of interest to release or consent shall:
(a) Indicate the approximate date and location of conception of the child and expected date of confinement of the mother.
(b) Inform the putative father of his rights . . . to file a notice of intent to claim
paternity before the birth of the child.
Id. 710.34()(2).
S
135. See notes 83-92 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 83-92 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 83-92 and accompanying text supra.
138. The fact that an unwed father may be able to establish substantial contacts, even though
the child is adopted immediately after birth, is suggested in the Michigan Adoption Statute
which provides:
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Caban cannot, however, be extended to the more troublesome problem
which exists when the unwed mother, who wishes to place her child for
immediate adoption, cannot or will not identify the father of the child, but
the father, if notified, would contribute to the costs incurred due to the
pregnancy. It is submitted that a bifurcated statute, with provisions specifically granting the unwed mother greater rights than the unwed father in this
139
type of situation, is required to sufficiently resolve the problem.
In analyzing the validity of such a statute, the court would first have to
consider the fact that newborns are the easiest to place and that the state,
therefore, has a greater interest in efficiently placing them. 140 Additionally,
the court should recognize that the mother, who has carried the child, has
14 1
established definite emotional and psychological ties with the newborn.
The father, on the other hand, has not established any of these ties with the
child, partly because he has made himself unavailable, and partly because of
the innate biological differences between a mother and a father. 142 Any
attempt to establish pre-birth "substantial contacts" 143 by notifying the
father would probably be ineffective because to use the mother's name in
the published notice might infringe upon her constitutional right to privacy. 144 Therefore, in this situation, the mother's ties with the child,
coupled with the compelling state interest in efficiently placing newborns,
would justify drawing a distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers. 145 It is submitted that such a distinction will support the application of a bifurcated statute which would grant the unwed father fewer rights
46
with respect to his child in this type of case.1
If the putative father is one who has established a custodial relationship with the child, or
has provided support or care for the mother during pregnancy or for either mother or
child after the child's birth . . . the rights of the putative father shall not be terminated
except by proceedings in accordance with section 2 of chapter 12a.
MICH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 710.39 (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). If the father in this situation
fails to respond to the notice which the statute affords him, see note 134 supra, the adoption
hearing could be held immediately at birth and his rights could be properly terminated. See
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.34(2)(d).
139. For the policy reasons underlying this distinction, see notes 127-32 and accompanying
text supra.
140. See notes 127-28 and accompanying text supra.
141. See note 129 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 130-31 and accompanying text supra.
143. For an explanation of how an unwed father can establish pre-birth "substantial contacts,"
see notes 133-38 and accompanying text supra.
144. See notes 123 & 130 and accompanying text supra.
145. 441 U.S. at 403-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. See note 132 and accompanying text supra. Although the dictum in Stanley would not
require the unwed father to be notified in this situation, see note 25 and accompanying text
supra, it is suggested that the bifurcated statute should provide the natural father with the right
to be notified of the adoption of his newborn. The granting of such a right is justifiable in the
context of his hypothetical situation because a minimum attempt should be made to involve the
unwed father since his lack of contact with the mother may not be due entirely to his own
neglect. This notice would be sufficient so long as it is in accordance with the appropriate notice
statute, such that the unwed father, in this situation, will not be entitled to any extraordinary
notice procedures. See notes 121-23 and accompanying text supra. If the notice is successful,
the father may attend the proceedings and comment on what he thinks would be in the child's
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THE NEED FOR NEW LEGISLATION IN PENNSYLVANIA

In the 1976 case of Adoption of Walker, 147 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania declared unconstitutional a portion of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act which provided that "[i]n the case of an illegitimate child, the consent of the mother only shall be necessary [for the child's adoption]."148
Since Walker, the Pennsylvania legislature has provided no additional statutory guidance concerning the unwed father's right to veto the adoption of his
child. It is suggested that in light of the diverse state interpretations of the
Stanley decision, 149 which until 1978 was the only United States Supreme
Court guidance in this area, the Pennsylvania legislature may have been
justified in its reluctance to enact a new statute. In the wake of the Caban
and Quilloin decisions, however, it is submitted that the legislature now has
sufficient guidelines with which to enact a statute that would be in accord
150
with the Federal Constitution.
In redrafting this section of the Adoption Act, it is suggested that the
following guidelines would satisfy the minimum requirements of the Federal
Constitution 551 relating to the unwed father's right to veto the adoption of
his child: 1) when the unwed father has established substantial contacts with
best interests, but he will be given no right to veto the adoption of his child. Regardless of
whether the notice is successful, it is submitted that the bifurcated statute may also include
more stringent requirements dealing with the unwed father's acknowledgment of paternity and
a stricter definition of abandonment such that efficient adoption of the newborn would be facilitated. See 441 U.S. at 392 n.ll.
147. 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
148. Id. at 171, 360 A.2d at 606. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1979). In
Walker, the unwed parents were living together when their child was born. 468 Pa. at 167, 360
A.2d at 604. Subsequently, the parents separated and the mother married another man. Id. Her
husband then filed a petition to adopt the child, and an adoption hearing was held without
notifying the unwed father. Id. at 168, 360 A.2d at 604. The adoption was permitted by the
court even though the natural father had not consented. Id. The unwed father then sought to
have the adoption decree reopened. Id. In denying his petition, the Orphan's Court held that
under Pennsylvania law, the unwed father was not entitled to notice of the adoption. Id. at
168-69 & n.1, 360 A.2d at 605 & n.1. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411 (Purdon Supp.
1979).
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the effect of the Pennsylvania
Adoption Act was that "Unwed fathers have no rights ....
while unwed mothers have all the
rights of married parents." 468 Pa. at 170-71, 360 A.2d at 605. Such a distinction, the court
concluded, violated Pennsylvania's equal rights amendment because the only differences between unwed fathers and unwed mothers are those based upon sex. Id. For Pennsylvania's
equal rights amendment, see PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28. The court also concluded that the Federal
Constitution would require the same result. Id. at 171 n.ll, 360 A.2d at 606 n.ll. Citing
Stanley, the court stated that even though factual differences existed between that case and
Walker, those distinctions would not compel a contrary result in the instant case. Id.
149. See notes 26-65 and accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 110-13 & 117-23 and accompanying text supra.
151. Because Walker was decided on the basis of the Pennsylvania Constitution's equal rights
amendment, it must be emphasized that these proposed guidelines are considered to be the
minimum requirements necessary to meet federal constitutional standards. See note 148 supra.
It should be noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remains free to establish stricter standards for compliance with the state equal rights amendment. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania equal rights amendment and its impact on domestic relations law, see 15 DuQ. L. REV.
757 (1977).
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the child, and has admitted paternity, then his consent would be a prerequisite to the adoption; 152 2) when the unwed father has not established
substantial contacts, then the state need only conduct a "best interests of the
child" hearing in which the father may participate, but only to offer evidence
as to what is in the child's best interests; 153 and 3) when the child is a
newborn, a bifurcated statute may give the father fewer rights in those cases
where the mother cannot or will not identify the father, whereas in those
father's rights
situations in which the father is identified and notified, the
154
will be determined by the Caban and Quilloin standards.
Additionally, it is submitted that Pennsylvania's statutory provision regarding notice must be revised. 155 Section 421 of the Adoption Act provides that notice of an adoption proceeding need only be given to those
persons whose consent to the adoption is required but not yet obtained. 156
Under the United States Supreme Court's analysis, this notice is probably
insufficient to meet minimum federal constitutional standards. 1 57 Even if
the consent of the unwed father is not necessary, he is still required to be
notified of any proceeding for terminating his parental rights in order to give
his
him the opportunity to offer evidence of what is in the best interests of
1 59
If
child. 158 If the unwed father is known, this notice should be personal.
satisfactory,
is
by
publication
notice
his identity is unknown, constructive
and the publication need not reveal the mother's name or include any extraordinary provisions merely because it is constructive notice. 160 Thus, it
is suggested that now, in light of Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, the Pennsylvania legislature has sufficient judicial guidance to effectively draft an adoption statute recognizing the unwed father's federal constitutional right to
notice and, when substantial contacts have been established 1 between the
16
unwed father and his child, the right to veto the adoption.

152. See notes 83-92, 98 & 108 and accompanying text supra.
153. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 124-46 and accompanying text supra.
155. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 421 (Purdon Supp.1979).
156. Id.
157. See notes 117-20 and accompanying text supra.
158. See notes 106-07 and accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 117-20 and accompanying text supra.
160. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 110-46 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that the requirements
established by the Supreme Court in these cases have been accurately addressed by the Michigan Adoption statute. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.31-.44 (Supp. 1979). For portions of
this statute, see notes 134 & 138 supra. Additionally, the Michigan statute has provided
adequate statutory language to deal with the peculiar problems that arise when the unwed
father seeks to establish substantial contacts with his newborn child. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 710.34, .36, .39 (Supp. 1979); note 138 supra. For a discussion of the newborn adoptee
situation, see notes 124-46 and accompanying text supra.
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V.

CONCLUSION

This comment has analyzed the holdings of Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, and has suggested that these cases have established specific rights for
the unwed father in adoption proceedings. 1 6 2 It has also been suggested
that these rights, as they have developed from Stanley through Caban, are
not as broad or as narrow as originally interpreted by some state legislatures. 163 Moreover, since Quilloin and Caban have enunciated specific
rights for the unwed father, 164 it is submitted that it is now time for the
Pennsylvania legislature to take definitive action and enact a new adoption
165
statute within the guidelines of these Supreme Court decisions.
Richard Gutekunst
162.
163.
164.
165.
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notes
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notes
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110-46 and accompanying text supra.
114-23 and accompanying text supra.
66-92 & 110-46 and accompanying text supra.
151-61 and accompanying text supra.
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